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1. The structure and moral psychology of misogyny
Kate Manne’s Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny combines traditional con-
ceptual analysis and feminist conceptual engineering with critical exploration
of cases drawn from popular culture and current events in order to produce
an ameliorative account of misogyny, that is, one that will help address the
problems of misogyny in the actual world. The result is a timely, engaging,
and relatively accessible account of a phenomenon that, in a variety of ways,
structures the lives of millions.
Manne’s definition of misogyny aims to capture usage patterns in many
feminist circles. She presents her view as an alternative to the naı¨ve yet wide-
spread belief that misogyny is a matter of the internal attitudes of individual
men. On Manne’s account, misogyny is not primarily a matter of the psych-
ology of individuals. Rather, it is a matter of the social norms, expectations,
and consequences that order the lives of women and girls under a system of
patriarchal oppression. Misogyny is to be contrasted with sexism, which
Manne takes to comprise the set of ideological justifications, often scientistic
in nature, that serve to rationalize and naturalize the patriarchal order.
On Manne’s account, the primary function of misogynistic acts and be-
haviours is to punish women who deviate from patriarchal norms and ex-
pectations. Under these norms, women are expected to provide men with
feminine-coded goods, such as deference, attention, care, and sympathy.
When women do not provide such goods or request masculine-coded
goods like status or authority, they can expect to be put in their place as
‘more or less subtly hostile, threatening, and punitive norm-enforcement
mechanisms will be standing at the ready ’ (p. 47). Misogyny is thus con-
strued as the series of ‘coercive enforcement mechanisms’ that ensure that
women stick to their assigned patriarchal roles of providing emotional labour
and that those who deviate from the script are swiftly punished.
Manne puts to rest many of the silly yet persistent myths surrounding
misogyny, such as the belief that misogyny involves hating or feeling nega-
tively toward all women. Why, she asks, should we expect even deeply mis-
ogynistic men to write off all women, even those who adhere to patriarchal
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standards of femininity, deference, obedience, emotional availability, and so
on? Such universal animosity toward women including those who amicably
serve the interests of men would require a very strange moral psychology. The
naı¨ve picture that misogyny involves animosity toward all women also super-
ficially restricts the phenomenon, as only men who hold the most severely
aversive attitudes towards women would count as misogynists.
Having dispensed with such an oversimplified moral psychology, Manne
gives an account of misogyny whereby it embraces a wide variety of attitudes,
specifically the ‘reactive attitudes’, such as blame, resentment, and guilt, as
well as a diversity of punishments such as shaming and ousting behaviour
(p. 58). Her extensive analysis of real-world examples shows that misogynistic
retribution can take a range of forms from subtle workplace hostility to
physical attacks and even mass murder.
In addition to offering an ameliorative account, one of Manne’s stated
goals is to produce an analysis that can be compatible with intersectional
work. This goal is situated in a recognition of the history of white feminism
and the problems it faces. The question that still exists for white women
doing feminist work in the twenty-first century is how to proceed without
doubling down on the worst parts of white feminism’s history and present.
White women, feminists included, have generally sought to share in the spoils
of white supremacy with white men. Much has been written on the devil’s
bargain that members of the early women’s suffrage movement made with
white supremacy. While early white women’s suffragists allied with abolition-
ists, they were weary of treating Black enfranchisement as a goal of equal
import to women’s suffrage. By treating the two instead as competing goals,
they made clear that their aim was to share in the racial and class-based
power and privilege that they felt they were entitled to as educated white
women of means. In an 1865 letter to the editor of the New York Standard,
Elizabeth Cady Stanton wrote:
The representative women of the nation have done their uttermost for the last
thirty years to secure freedom for the negro; and as long as he was lowest in the
scale of being, we were willing to press his claims; but now, as the celestial gate to
civil rights is slowly moving on its hinges, it becomes a serious question whether we
had better stand aside and see ‘Sambo’ walk into the kingdom first. (Davis 1983,
p. 70)
A sense of entitlement to share in the benefits of white supremacy motivated
white women suffragists, and this was exacerbated by their perception that
Black people were gaining ground at their expense. A century and a half later,
white women voted for an openly misogynistic and white nationalist presi-
dential candidate because they cherished the privileges of white supremacy
and were unwilling to renounce them.
A feminist account of misogyny that is both intersectional and ameliorative
must provide theoretical tools for recognizing misogyny in its many-dimen-
sional forms, as it interacts and overlaps with other oppressions. It must also
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be able to hold women with power and privilege accountable for their role in
perpetrating misogyny against other women. Does Manne’s account rise to
this challenge? In some ways it does, and in others it does not. Manne rec-
ognizes that white women have played a central role in upholding white
supremacy and participating in the oppression of women of colour, which
is an important starting point. But while she thinks subtly about many of the
material conditions that create misogyny as a set of normative social prac-
tices, she does not fully extend this care to the other intersectional forms of
oppression she discusses. If Manne had done for other dimensions of op-
pression what she does for gender, she would have been better able to fulfil
the promises of her text.
After touching on the book’s strengths, I track variations of the main
problem as it shows up throughout the text. This is its failure fully to con-
ceive of oppressions besides sexism and misogyny as systemic patterns of
social practices, as inherently structural rather than mere collections of indi-
vidual beliefs and behaviours. It is important to note that the critiques offered
here are in the spirit of our shared goals. They are also in the spirit of
promoting the success of this project so that it isn’t brought down by the
problems it didn’t have to have.
2. Monsters and golden boys
A particularly illuminating section of the book is Manne’s exhortation to
readers to give up certain conceptual and rhetorical practices that excuse and
absolve men who perpetrate violence against women. The urgency of this
issue is evident in the chapter ‘Exonerating Men’, where Manne looks closely
at the narratives deployed about Brock Turner, a 19-year-old convicted rapist,
who was described during his trial as one of Stanford’s star athletes and the
loss of whose bright future was repeatedly lamented. So great was concern for
the rapist’s future that he was sentenced to a mere six months in prison, of
which he served only three.
The rhetoric surrounding the case illustrates why the ‘golden boy ’ narra-
tive must be relinquished. The narrative’s argument works to clear allegations
on the basis of character: Turner is a golden boy; a golden boy wouldn’t do
this; therefore Turner wouldn’t do this. Manne notes the words of one of
Turner’s female friends who testified that he had always been sweet and
caring toward her. The friend distinguished Turner’s crime from that of
someone who would kidnap and rape a woman in a parking lot at night:
‘That is a rapist. I know for a fact that Brock is not one of these people’
(p. 198). As Manne emphasizes, ‘the trouble is, virtually no one will seem like
“that person” to people who know them, especially their family and friends’
(p. 211). Male perpetrators of sexual violence often have female friends and
family members who love them and whom they love in return and even treat
with care and respect. This does not preclude them from perpetrating sexual
abuse against others.
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Manne pointedly diagnoses the reasoning behind these harmful rape
myths:
‘These people’ are pictured as unlovable, invulnerable, and as having no past
beyond their crimes, no life of their own to date, and no valuable future to miss out
on. ‘That person’ is not a socially situated, morally multifaceted, and sometimes
talented human being. Rather, they are a caricature; or, again, a monster. (p. 211)
Manne’s account of exoneration-via-caricature captures what so many sur-
vivors of sexual violence have heard from well-meaning friends, family mem-
bers, colleagues, and mentors: ‘Him? Really? But he is such a nice guy! And
he’s married! Are you sure you didn’t misinterpret it? We had him to dinner
recently, and I just can’t believe that he would do that’. These rape myths are
resources that perpetrators of sexual violence rely on for epistemic cover.
They draw on them to create plausible deniability so that they may continue
their violations. Manne usefully draws attention to the urgent need to change
these myths and perceptions if we are to make progress in our collective
reasoning about rape.
3. Dehumanization is a social process
Just as Manne argues that it does not take an especially monstrous villain to
commit acts of sexual violence, she also argues that it does not take an
especially monstrous conception of an oppressed group as sub-human in
order to commit acts of mass cruelty or genocide against them. In the chapter
‘Humanizing Hatred’, Manne takes aim at humanism, which she character-
izes as the view that treating others cruelly often depends on conceiving of
them as less than human. Manne argues against the common view that de-
humanization plays a central role in the perpetration of violence and cruelty
against marginalized, othered populations.
Manne conceives of dehumanization in an unusual way—as the straight-
forward, literal belief that the relevant population is non-human or sub-
human. But there is an important distinction between dehumanization as
an ideologically driven, propagandistic, social process, and dehumanization
as a stable belief in the lack of the Other’s humanity. While Manne’s target is
the latter view, it is the former that is most relevant to the book’s purposes.
Here, Manne’s discussion of dehumanization would be more illuminating
(as well as ameliorative) if it were more similar to her take on misogyny—
namely, if she eschewed an oversimplified psychology and recognized the
phenomenon ‘as a property of social environments first and foremost’
(p. 66). Just as Manne recognizes misogyny to be a system of enforcement
mechanisms rather than the descriptive belief that women are inferior to
men, dehumanization should be recognized as an ongoing social process
rather than merely a theory about the propositional content of individuals’
beliefs.
Manne’s primary argument against humanism is that many of the acts that
dominant groups perpetrate in order to enforce oppression in fact depend on
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the humanity of the oppressed group in order to make sense. Even the pro-
cess of dehumanization itself hinges on the human status of the target.
Manne explains,
When a white police officer in Ferguson called a group of black political protestors
‘fucking animals’ … he was using this trope to demean and degrade the protestors
and reassert his own dominance … Such put-downs would hardly be apropos when
it comes to actual non-human animals, who could neither comprehend the insult
nor be successfully put down by having their nonhuman status correctly identified.
This requires human comprehension, not to mention an incipient human status to
be degraded from. (p. 164, emphasis in original)
This may well be true, but it does little to undermine the claim that dehu-
manization as a social and psychological process increases associations be-
tween a subordinated group and non-human animals in a way that facilitates
cruelty and oppression. Acknowledging the empirical research in this area is
essential to understanding the phenomenon of dehumanization and its per-
nicious effects.
Goff, Eberhardt, Williams and Jackson (2008) showed both that white
Americans have significant implicit associations between Black faces and
apes and that stronger associations were linked with greater support for
anti-Black police violence. The authors also looked at news archives of stories
written about people convicted of capital crimes and found that Black con-
victs were more likely than white convicts to be described using ape-like
language connoting animalistic and subhuman qualities. They further
found that those who were described using such language were more likely
to be executed by the state.
There is no real conflict then between the view that a process of dehuman-
ization makes cruelty easier and the claim that it is the belief in the humanity
of the oppressed group which makes the process of dehumanizing them
necessary in the first place. As has often been emphasized, ideological sche-
mas that justify oppression and the controlling images they produce need not
be coherent or consonant with one another and are, in fact, frequently
inconsistent.
During U.S. slavery, the social process of dehumanization of African and
African-descended peoples allowed white people to enact a brutal regime of
racial domination. Proponents of slavery asserted that forced manual labour
was good for ‘Africans’ and that their minds could not function properly
without it. Slaveowner, physician, and famous scientific racist Josiah Nott
justified the continued enslavement of African-descended peoples on the
basis of conjured craniological features that purported to demonstrate
limits on their capacities for rationality. Yet laws across the antebellum
South prohibited teaching slaves to read. Plantation owners frequently ex-
pressed the belief that people held in slavery were sub-human ‘animals’, yet
Plantation owners’ wives forced lactating enslaved women to nurse their
white infants. But if African and African-descended enslaved peoples
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weren’t capable of higher thought, what would have been so dangerous about
their having access to education? And if slaveowners sincerely believed that
enslaved peoples were animals, then why would they force them to nurse
their infant children?
One thing Manne’s chapter can be taken to show is that there is an element
of bad faith in the production of dehumanizing propaganda and ideology.
But this does not mitigate the need to recognize that processes of dehuman-
ization are absolutely central to all forms of oppression, or that dehuman-
ization comprises a collection of social practices that structure hierarchical
orderings of bodies and lives. Even the forms of debasement and control that
humans practise over non-human animals are systems of social practices of
devaluation and domination. There is no manifestation of oppression that is
not a social practice. When we talk about the role that dehumanization as a
social process plays in producing violence against oppressed groups, it is clear
that we are not generally talking about sincerely and literally believing in the
sub-humanity of oppressed groups.
4. Amelioration and intersectionality
Producing an ameliorative account of misogyny involves creating the social
imaginary required to engage with the material realities of multiple dimen-
sions of oppression. Manne’s tendency to avoid thinking structurally about
forms of oppression beyond those experienced by cisgender class-privileged
white women manifests in some of her methodological assumptions, which
conflict with her stated goal of creating an ameliorative account of misogyny.
Manne invokes her lack of lived experience as the reason she does not engage
at all with the pressingly urgent issue of transmisogyny. She writes, ‘I regret
not being able to speak to its nature. That being said, it seemed evident to me
I didn’t have the requisite authority to do so’ (p. 25). Manne takes the Tuvel/
Hypatia controversy to highlight the ‘need for lived experience to speak on
these matters’. But her lack of lived experience does not stop Manne from
speaking on misogynoir, so it is clear that she does not take lived experience
to be a necessary condition of engagement. While epistemic humility is laud-
able, it does not entail that one should abdicate the responsibility to engage
with the work of those who do face transmisogyny or to create a theoretical
framework that considers and accounts for this phenomenon.
Trans women and transfeminine people experience numerous, multi-fa-
ceted manifestations of transmisogyny. These include incarceration in men’s
prisons, where they are vulnerable to assault, harassment, and sexual violence;
lack of legal protection from job discrimination; lack of access to safe hous-
ing, and to life-saving and life-affirming medical care; medical and psychi-
atric gaslighting about their bodies and gender identities; and exclusion from
feminist spaces and online harassment from a subset of self-identified radical
feminists who target trans women in response to their public critiques of
trans-exclusionary radical feminism.










niversity of Tennessee Library user on 21 January 2019
Though Manne does not engage with the phenomenon of transmisogyny,
she nonetheless expects her proposal to be counted as an ‘ameliorative, inter-
sectional’ one (p. 62). But what is the justification for Manne’s assumption
that her account provides a structural blueprint that can be made to fit
unproblematically with the complex contours of social reality? Trans
women may be able to fulfil exactly the patriarchal standards for women
that Manne lays out (for example, providing feminine-coded goods to
men) yet still be subject to trans-specific forms of misogyny and transmiso-
gynistic retribution. If one does not begin by attending to the relevant details
of intersectional forms of misogyny, such as the way that transmisogyny and
misogynoir function, for instance, there is little reason to think that the
resulting account will be one that can be pressed into the service of their
amelioration. Worse, the resulting account might inadvertently perpetuate
these forms of oppression (as is the case, for instance, with Manne’s denial
that dehumanization facilitates cruelty).
To illustrate the force of this concern—which applies to much work in
feminist philosophy—consider Manne’s account in light of the cautionary
tale of Sally Haslanger’s (2012) view on the metaphysics of womanhood.
Haslanger does not take the amelioration of transmisogyny to be a necessary
starting point for her account of what it is to be a woman, and she proposes
an account on which women are understood to be just those people who are
subordinated on the basis of their real or imagined biological capacities for
reproduction. She thus ends up unintentionally excluding many trans women
from the category of ‘woman’, namely those trans women who do not ‘pass’
as cisgender (Jenkins 2016). By defining ‘woman’ in a way that inadvertently
entails that many trans women are not women, Haslanger’s work can be used
to perpetuate the very ideology that naturalizes discrimination against trans
women and is used to justify the pervasive physical and sexual violence
against them. It is clear from this example that feminist work that aims to
be both ameliorative and intersectional must do a great deal more than
simply state the desire to be so perceived.
Manne assumes that her account is compatible with an intersectional
understanding of structural oppression, noting that her ‘ameliorative analysis
explicitly builds in space for these insights’ (p. 13). But making room for
intersectional insights is not the same as thinking structurally about inter-
secting oppressions. As mainstream feminism continues to be narrowly
focused on cisgender white women—vividly exemplified by the Women’s
March’s embrace of pink pussyhats as its unifying symbol—feminist theorists
must do more than merely ‘build in space’ for marginalized voices and inter-
sectional insights. If Manne had worked to create the social imaginary ne-
cessary to theorize misogyny and other forms of oppression as structurally
interdependent, she would be well on her way to developing an ameliorative
intersectional proposal.
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While Manne acknowledges axes of oppression other than gender, she
largely invokes intersectionality as a disclaimer rather than as an orienting
framework. In one case, she ignores the systemic conditions that are specific
to Black women in order to universalize a Black feminist framework to apply
it to class-privileged white women. In her discussion of non-fatal manual
strangulation, Manne describes brutal scenes of domestic violence and the
resulting silences by the women who survived them. She writes, ‘The matter
will often go no further. She may not seek medical treatment. The incident
will be “shrouded in silence” (Dotson 2011, 244)’ (p. 2). Manne invokes
Kristie Dotson’s work on the systemic pressures Black women feel not to
speak up when they experience domestic violence at the hands of Black men,
so as not to provide fodder for racist stereotypes about Black men and ag-
gression. Dotson writes, ‘Domestic violence within, for example, African
American communities is often shrouded in silence given the possibility
that testimony about domestic violence can be understood to corroborate
stereotypes concerning the imagined “violent” black male’ (p. 245). Manne
ignores the structural analysis that Dotson builds into her work when she
universalizes her words by importing them into the materially distinct con-
text of white women experiencing domestic violence by wealthy and powerful
white men. In ignoring the particular context of Dotson’s work, Manne thus
seems to participate in the phenomenon that she later dubs ‘Black women’s
herasure’ (p. 214).
Despite the fact that Manne titles her discussion of Daniel Holtzclaw
‘Misogynoir in Action’, a substantive analysis of the role of misogynoir in
the case is largely missing. Holtzclaw, a white and Japanese-American police
officer from Oklahoma City, raped and sexually assaulted more than a dozen
Black women, many of whom had formerly worked in the sex trade. Yet
Manne offers little analysis of the systems that place Black women sex workers
among those most vulnerable to police violence. Manne does not frame
police sexual violence against Black women as a matter of police brutality
against Black people more generally. Nor does she address the hypersexuali-
zation of Black women and girls that contributes to the disproportionately
high rates of sexual violence against them and to their disproportionately low
rates of redress through the criminal justice system.
Black women are the women most likely to be forced into the prison-
industrial complex, where sexual violence continues to be used systematically
as a tool of subjugation. The war on drugs, broken windows policing, and the
criminalization of sex work are all systems of policing that make Black
women, and especially Black trans women, particularly vulnerable to police
sexual violence (Ritchie 2017). These should thus be central components of
any structural analysis of the relationship between misogynoir and police
sexual violence.
The Cato Institute reports that sexual misconduct is the second most
common type of police misconduct report filed after excessive use of force.
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Police officers also commit sexual assaults at a significantly higher rate than
the general population (2010). Those who are transgender are at significantly
increased risk of state-sanctioned sexual violence, as are those who work in
the sex trade. Police officers frequently coerce those who engage in sex work
into sexual acts under threat of arrest. Police sexual violence is not an aber-
ration; it is widespread and systemic to the point of being routine. Until this
year, it was not illegal in New York state for arresting officers to have sex with
detainees in their custody. These policies along with the lack of police over-
sight create ideal material conditions for police officers to commit rape and
sexual assault. If Manne is going to conceive of misogyny as a system of
norms and their material enforcement mechanisms, she ought to do the
same for police sexual violence.
Holtzclaw is not the only high-profile police rapist to target Black women
in his abuse of power. In 2004, Roger Magan˜a was convicted of raping over a
dozen women in Eugene, Oregon. Magan˜a’s behaviour went on for an eight-
year period as many of the women he assaulted, most of whom were Black,
low-income, and previously criminalized did not report out of fear of retali-
ation and not being believed. It later came out that several other officers and
supervisors had been made aware of complaints about Magan˜a’s abuses but
wrote them off as the mere ‘grumblings of junkies and prostitutes’ (Ritchie
2017). The parallels between the two cases are important, as they are indica-
tive of the systemic patterns that enable the perpetuation of misogynoir.
Manne does not so much provide a structural analysis of the misogynoir at
play as simply note that the social meaning of Holtzclaw’s actions was con-
tingent on his victims ‘being women, of a particular race and class, inter alia,
in this case, in a hitherto man’s world’ (p. 217). At times, she reduces the case
to an example of single-axis oppression, suggesting that Holtzclaw may have
been acting from a sense of moral entitlement and perhaps aiming to ‘wreak
revenge on women who fail to uphold their end of history ’s bad gendered
bargain’ (p. 217). Her analysis of Holtzclaw’s abuses does little to address the
systemic social causes that create and enable the forces of misogynoir that are
at work in the case. While Manne explicitly warns against the danger of
perpetuating the ‘a few bad apples’ narrative of misogyny and sexual violence,
her discussion of Holtzclaw unwittingly plays into this narrative by failing to
situate the case within the broader social systems that condone and protect
practices of state-sponsored sexual violence against Black women.
Manne further avoids any real discussion of the structural conditions that
create vulnerability for sex workers under patriarchy, despite the fact that sex
workers are among those who most frequently experience what Manne takes
to be paradigmatic of misogyny. Sex workers are the targets of anger, back-
lash, and violence for making money from the provision of services, namely
sexual and emotional labour, that women are expected to provide to men
willingly and enthusiastically and without charge. Sex workers face extreme
levels of dehumanization that diminish their bodily autonomy, justify life-
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threatening physical and sexual violence against them, and prevent legal re-
course for such violence. The criminalization of sex work and the pervasive
assumption that sex workers cannot be the victims of rape block sex workers
from accessing justice through the court system. Here again, Manne’s inad-
equate conceptualization of dehumanization as a literal belief rather than a
set of social practices creates a major obstacle to understanding how mis-
ogyny affects the lives of those who are situated at the intersection of multiple
dimensions of marginalization.
Manne’s section on the patriarchal control of women’s reproduction is
subject to similar shortcomings. Manne focuses solely on abortion and on the
Conservative Right’s efforts to retaliate morally against women who seek
them. She ignores the long history of the eugenicist practice of denying
women of colour and poor white women the right to reproduce and raise
children. There is no recognition of the forced sterilization of Black, Puerto
Rican, and Native women, nor of the controlling images that portray them as
unfit mothers who are poor, promiscuous, negligent, and immoral. Had these
details been included, they would have complicated Manne’s idea that patri-
archal ideology treats the mother’s womb as inextricably related to the notion
of a man’s dominion over his home. Manne suggests that the foetus ‘serves as
a powerful cultural symbol or surrogate for certain men’s sense of being
neglected or deprived by women’ (p. 100) and that dominant men thus
come to view abortion as the ‘helpless foetus’ being cast out of its ‘rightful
sanctuary ’. Yet, it is hard to see how the treatment of Black, Latinx, and
Native women fits into ‘the analogy between a mother’s womb and a dom-
inant man’s home-cum-haven—or safe space’ (p. 101). Their wombs, for
example, have been portrayed as especially unsafe and unfit environments,
and this provides justification for the rigid control of and prohibition on
their reproduction. The upshot here is that a failure to think structurally
about oppressions other than one’s own limits the scope, accuracy, and use-
fulness of one’s resulting conceptual picture.
Manne makes a number of gestures toward producing an intersectional
account of misogyny, but does not always attend to the differences that make
a difference—a key component of intersectional work. Manne invokes Audre
Lorde’s oft-cited but rarely engaged 1984 piece ‘The Master’s Tools’ as a
warning against white women overgeneralizing their own experiences as uni-
versal in feminist theory. But Lorde’s piece also calls for substantive engage-
ment with the differences and power disparities in women’s lives in order to
forge solidarity across these differences. Lorde writes,
If white American feminist theory need not deal with the differences between us,
and the resulting differences in our oppressions, then how do you deal with the fact
that the women who clean your houses and tend to your children while you attend
conferences on feminist theory are, for the most part, poor women and women of
Colour? (2007, p. 112)
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While Manne focuses on ways that patriarchy requires the exploitation of
women’s domestic, emotional, and care-giving labour in order to function,
her account could work better to address the reality that this sort of labour is
specifically demanded from women of colour, often by class-privileged white
women, who rely on their labour in order to pursue careers, pay cheques, and
‘equality ’ with white men.
It is clear that we will need a range of conceptual tools to combat misogyny
in all its forms. What tools will we need to uproot misogynoir? To end trans-
misogyny? Attention to the complexity and diversity of the material conditions
that produce misogyny is necessary for a feminist theory to be able to produce
an intersectional ameliorative strategy. While Manne’s account is certainly on
the way to this goal, it has some distance to go before reaching it.*
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